Pascal's wager has been the subject of protracted philosophical interest since its posthumous appearance over three centuries ago. As Terence Penelhum has noted, many 'philosophers feel it is somehow a professional obligation not to accept it. ' Nevertheless, some modern philosophers have given the wager a sympathetic reading in hopes of its rehabilitation, and I count myself in their number. Without recounting all the wager's complexities, I will first explain roughly its basic structure and then critique two objections against it that impugn the nature of the religious belief advocated by Pascal. Space limi tations will necessitate waiving certain important objections to the wager's prologue concerning the actual prudential situation of the wagerer. My focus will instead be on two aspects of what I will call 'wagering belief': (i) Whether Pascal's recommendations for inducing belief involve an epistem ically illicit brainwashing and (2) whether or not the requirement of theistic belief for salvation is defensible on theological grounds.
Pascal's wager attempts to bring the sceptic to the point of desiring belief in God even though the initial epistemic case for God's existence is indeter minate for that individual. Pascal then marshals the prudential resources of heaven and hell2 to persuade the sceptic that he should believe in God. The upshot is that given the possible benefits or detriments of one's beliefs it is safer and smarter to be a theist. If one is a theist and there is no God, less is lost than if one is an atheist and there is a God who requires belief in God for endless felicity.3 The sceptic in Pascal's dialogue is convinced of this prudential reasoning, but confesses that he can yet not believe. Pascal then advises him to act like a believer in order that in time he will become a sincere believer. Pascal's language indicates that by engaging the religious practices of The Gospel of John reports Jesus saying to some unbelieving religious leaders, 'How can you believe [in me] when you seek approval from others? '7 Jesus contends that a prideful regard for personal status could inhibit one from apprehending the truth of his identity. Along this line, consider the case of a prideful actor named Charles who, now being past his illustrious prime, refuses to recognize the brilliance of a younger actor, Rodney, who is su perbly executing the kinds of roles Charles once excelled in performing. But because of his age, Charles can no longer play the parts that once made him famous and which now are catapulting Rodney into nouveau celebrity. The elder's pride and jealousy blinds him to the talents of his younger 'rival'. He refuses to believe that Rodney is a rising star.
Imagine that this actor is counselled by a wise friend -who is interested in reconciling the bemused Charles to the younger 'rival' -to watch Rodney's best acting performance on video tape three times within one week. In so doing, the friend hopes that Charles's prideful oblivion will be overcome as the actor's theatrical prowess progressively impresses the old actor with each successive showing. Charles reluctantly consents to the programme and later confesses Rodney's greatness, along with admitting the blindness of his former pride. He now has eyes to see.
This sort of example is especially germane to the claim Pascal is making regarding cupidity: given the fallen human condition, human pride has the tendency to filter out that which would humble one; and this would especially be true with respect to recognizing the existence of a morally impeccable deity before whom one is exhaustively accountable and without excuse.
These kinds of examples strongly suggest that Pascal's programme need not be viewed as religious brainwashing. A plausible view is that he is advocating a vulnerability to rational persuasion through various religious practices that may serve to mollify the passions and thus soften one to certain claims not otherwise convincing. This may, in fact, be what Pascal meant when he said that after wagering the one wagering 'will realize that you have wagered on something certain and infinite for which you have paid nothing'.8 Here 'certain' may well have an epistemic richness that exceeds both what is possible through mere habituation and what is offered to the sceptic at the beginning of the wager when he can only see the case between theism and atheism as a toss up. We can corroborate this subsequent epi stemic enrichment with another fragment from Pense'es that explains that a wilful change in existential orientation can make new perspectives possible, perspectives that are not necessarily contrived, but, rather, occasioned through voluntary refocusing:
The will is one of the chief organs of belief, not because it creates belief, but because things are true or false according to the aspects by which we judge them. When the ' John 5: 44. 8 Pascal, 4I8/233. will likes one aspect more than another, it deflects the mind from considering the qualities of the one it does not care to see. Thus the mind, keeping in step with the will, remains looking at the aspect preferred by the will and sojudged by what it sees there.9
The wager argument induces one to attend to areas of concern not normally attractive -through engaging in religious rituals that presuppose a recognition of moral failing and the need for divine grace -in the hope of attaining what is ultimately attractive; that is, peace in this life and heaven in the next. The will is directed to consider life from a different perspective that may become one's own perspective. In this indirect sense, then, 'the will is one of the chief organs of [or for apprehending] belief', although it does not 'create belief'. I take this to mean that a deliberate refocusing of one's attention may lead to new perspectives and insights not otherwise possible.
The prudentially encouraged religious experimentalism advocated by Pascal is clearly distinguishable from any kind of coercive proselytizing that might produce beliefs that are epistemically unreliable due to the doxastic improprieties occasioning their formation. Consider a religious cult that entices new members through deception about the nature of the group and then endeavours to enlist the inquirer's total allegiance to the cult through sleep deprivation, 'love bombing', a restricted diet, arduous propagandizing sessions, and other skilfully administered mental manipulations. Those who succumb to this regimen could form certain beliefs (typically about the infallibility of the cult's leadership and its apocalyptic scenarios) by virtue of their participation in the cult's activities.
However, this cultic indoctrination is a far epistemic cry from the brand of experimentalism Pascal has in mind, in which the wagerer embarks upon the religious experiment conscious of the prudential stakes involved, the truth-claims at issue, and the nature of the (noncoercive) religious activities in which he plans voluntarily to participate. He is never required to submit to any doxastic improprieties.
It could be argued, though, that Pascal's approach begs the question as to whether the Christian God exists because he assumes that sin (a specifically Christian doctrine) hinders people from believing in God. This objection seems to fail, though, because Pascal does not require that the wagerer adopt the Christian view of sin (he is still too sceptical for that), but rather that he pursue certain religious activities that might illumine cognitive avenues not now available -one of which would be the Christian view of sin. The religious activities may be pursued with a kind of experimentalism which does not require a dogmatic affirmation at the onset. Contrary to Hick, if certain religious practices may help induce an epi stemically warranted belief in God (as I argued above), the throne will not, then, be 'apparently empty' at all. But this still leaves the issue of whether the supposed occupant is but a 'touchy Eastern potentate' -meaning a theologically distorted projection of ancient Semitic fears that Pascal inher ited.
The above construction of the Pascalian project is still somewhat program matic. A more nuanced account ofjust what is involved in seeking to
Although the prudential results of the wager turn on whether one believes in God or not, to limit Pascal's position to this factor would be misleading because theological assent alone cannot be artificially divorced from the entire religious life Pascal is advocating. He is arguing that one who makes the wager and comes to faith is in a unique position to receive spiritual and ethical benefits not otherwise available, both in this life and in the next.
Speaking to his interlocutor near the end of the wager fragment, Pascal says,
Now what harm will come to you from choosing this course? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full of good works, a sincere, true friend ... It is true you will not enjoy noxious pleasures, glory and good living, but will you not have others ?"3 Believing in God is not simply an isolated act of assent divorced from the contours of one's overall life. Faith in God is, according to Pascal, rather seen as a means to the end of changing one's entire existence -an end that is otherwise unavailable. For instance, if I endeavour to become a great vi olinist, I need a master teacher. I cannot teach myself successfully, even if I am a child prodigy. Yet I will never progress as a violinist if I refuse to believe in the worthiness of a virtuoso instructor. I must believe in her ability to teach me and follow her instructions in order to receive the training that will enable me to advance as a musician. If I deny either that I need an instructor or that the instructor is capable, I cannot enter into a musically transforming relationship.
Pascal's claim is much the same. He doesn't view belief in God as an isolated event distinct either from other theistically entailed beliefs or from the believer's overall pattern of life and world-view. One is not simply adding a single, atomistic belief to one's epistemic repertoire. To finally find faith 'the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob' one must recognize a need for salvation which involves an admission of moral wrongdoing and the need for forgiveness and moral renewal. (Although, as mentioned earlier, one does not assent to all these Christian doctrines in order to begin the wagering process.) One is also urged to believe and receive the benefits of belief; that is, the grace of God which transfigures one's moral and spiritual life both in Pascal's claim is that a certain kind of moral and spiritual transformation is impossible without the benefits of belief and spiritual commitment. This is a controversial claim inextricably tied to his doctrine of the fall, but the argument given above, I think, deflects the criticisms that maintain that it is unjust to reward one merely on the basis of belief.
Although in the wager fragment Pascal speaks only of assenting to God's existence, his argumentation in other important fragments includes appeals to trust in Christ, the Mediator, as required for divine benefit. For example, Pascal says: Pascal's Christian world-view is also implicit in the wager wlhen he speaks of engaging in specifically Christian religious practices (having masses said, taking holy water) in order to induce Christian (and not simply theistic) belief.'9 Thus, for Pascal, belief in the deity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for eternal life. One must entrust oneself to the grace of the Mediator to receive that grace.
CONCLUSION:
WAGERING BELIEF NOT DEFEATED
The wager has generated tremendous opposition on several grounds, many of which we cannot now discuss. Nevertheless, I have argued that Pascal's account of wagering belief meets two important and related objections to its legitimacy. These are objections that must be neutralized if the wager argument is to have any hope of being defended or rehabilitated for purposes Pascal would recognize as his own. First, the pursuit of religious practices for the sake of attaining certainty need not be a self-induced brainwashing; it can be understood as a prudent experiment making legitimate belief possible. Second, God's stipulation of theistic belief need not be interpreted as an arbitrary theological dictate issued by a cranky deity but can be understood as a constitutive epistemic element of the overall spiritual restoration of the Christian believer. 
